The Economic Costs of Democratic Backsliding? Backsliding and State Location Preferences of U.S. Job-seekers

Michael J. Nelson
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
The Pennsylvania State University
mjn15@psu.edu

Christopher Witko
Professor
School of Public Policy
The Pennsylvania State University
cxw877@psu.edu

Short Title: The Economic Costs of Democratic Backsliding?

Abstract

Political checks on democratic backsliding can be ineffective. But, there may be *economic* costs for backsliding regimes if talented individuals seeking job opportunities prefer to not live in backsliding areas. Of course, factors other than the quality of democracy may be more important to job seekers, limiting the efficacy of this economic check. We test these possibilities in an area characterized as experiencing backsliding - the U.S. states - using a conjoint experiment. We provide hypothetical job opportunities to a sample of U.S. adults in the labor market and another sample of students at a large, selective public university. We find that jobs located in states experiencing democratic backsliding are viewed less favorably. Moreover, some types of backsliding affect willingness to "accept" a hypothetical job, especially among Democrats in the non-student sample.

Introduction

Throughout the world, concerns are growing about "democratic backsliding," the gradual state-led erosion and weakening of the institutions of democracy (Bermeo 2016). The U.S. states, for example, have restricted voting rights, limited the power of popularly elected officials, and engaged in other actions viewed as eroding democracy (Epperly et al. 2019; Reynolds 2016). What forces limit states, within the U.S. and internationally, from engaging in backsliding?

Political checks on backsliding are most obvious, but it can be hard for citizens to recognize backsliding until it is too late. Further, internal regime opponents are those most likely to be targeted with limits on political voice (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). External political actors (nation states or national governments) can also sanction backsliding regimes. But, if they are indifferent to backsliding, they will not use these powers.

Economic checks on backsliding may hold promise. Polities compete to attract talented individuals to contribute to economic growth (Kerr et al. 2016). If talented individuals are less likely to migrate to backsliding areas, democratic erosion will harm the economies of backsliding states over the long term. This potential economic harm could prevent officials from engaging in backsliding now or broaden opposition to the regime later. On the other hand, not everyone values democracy to the same degree, and considerations other than backsliding may weigh more heavily in job seekers' minds. If so, people may sort into polities based on their preferred levels of democracy (Tiebout 1956), but their actions would neither affect economic growth nor provide a check on backsliding. Understanding the potential economic checks on backsliding is our goal in this paper.

The context for our study is the U.S. states, which compete to attract productive residents (Peterson 1995) and, according to observers, have recently engaged in backsliding (Epperly et al. 2019, Reynolds 2016). To examine how backsliding may shape career-related migration decisions, we use a conjoint experiment providing hypothetical job opportunities to a sample of individuals in the labor market and another sample of students at a large public university. We randomize a number of job and location at-

tributes, including contemporary examples of backsliding taken from the U.S. states. We find that subjects view jobs less favorably when located in a backsliding state and that some forms of backsliding affect the willingness to "accept" a hypothetical job, especially for Democrats in the non-student sample.

Competition for Migrants as a Check on Backsliding?

There is no doubt that most individuals in affluent democracies profess to value democracy when asked in surveys (Inglehart 2008). Nation-states and the U.S. states vigorously compete for talented migrants to enhance economic performance (Kerr et al. 2016; Peterson 1995). And, the U.S. states use public policy to attract migrants (Peterson 1995; Young et al. 2016). Young and highly educated individuals, who are especially attractive for state governments, seek to live and work in areas with many cultural and recreational amenities (Partridge 2010). Might the robustness of democracy be just such an amenity?

Research shows that individuals in the EU migrate from areas with lower to higher quality of government (Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose 2015). Public choice scholars have argued that the easy exit option presented by federalism preserved liberty by allowing people to flee a nasty leviathan (Lynch 2004). Indeed, millions of Blacks left the South during the Jim Crow Era to pursue better economic opportunities but also to flee the violent, authoritarian politics of the region (Tolnay and Beck 1992). Internal migration in the United States does not pose as many language and cultural barriers as international migration, and most Americans have more resources and probably a higher expectation of democracy than Blacks fleeing the South during Jim Crow. Thus, Americans may have a greater willingness and ability to act on democratic preferences in migration decisions.

On the other hand, many violations of democracy in the contemporary U.S. are minor compared to international authoritarian regimes or the Jim Crow South. And, job seekers might weigh factors—like amenities, pay, and benefits—more heavily than a state's democratic climate when making their employment decisions. Thus, rather than migrating on the basis of the quality of democracy, people may simply sort into different states on the basis of job conditions and other factors (Smith, Chapman and Jones 2015; Tiebout 1956)

It also seems that individuals value living in areas with people who share their partisanship and ideology. Liu, Andris & Desmarais (2019) and Graham & Svolik (2020) find that most people are unwilling to penalize their preferred party for violating democratic practices. Because most recent examples of democratic backsliding have happened in states with Republican governments, backsliding regimes may be unlikely to be penalized much in migration decisions by Republicans compared to Democrats.

Research Design and Analysis

Observational designs to test these migration or sorting arguments face myriad challenges. Because government characteristics and economic performance are correlated (Acemoglu et al. 2014), systematically measuring the economic effects of backsliding across states is difficult. Moreover, Census Bureau data on state-to-state migration patterns over short periods of time is scarce. Those data that do exist are too coarse to use to determine how economic and political considerations shape migration. Therefore, we use a conjoint experimental approach. Our respondents were presented with pairs of job offers that vary on a fairly large number of dimensions, including the job's benefits, the company's culture, location, and size, the partisan leaning of the state in which the job is located, the job's starting salary, and the presence and type of democratic backsliding. This experimental approach follows many existing studies in the field of human resource management examining how job attributes shape their evaluation by job seekers (Smith, Chapman and Jones 2015).

To assess whether backsliding reduces the attractiveness of job offers, we conducted two identical conjoint experiments on two different samples of Americans. First, we surveyed 750 MTurkers in September 2019. The merits and disadvantages of MTurk as a subject pool are well-known; we merely note that many scholars have found findings from MTurk to replicate in other, more representative samples (e.g., Berinsky, Huber & Lenz 2012). Second, we surveyed 368 undergraduate students at a large state university. While student samples have their own well-known drawbacks, a student sample is almost ideal for our purposes: undergraduate students are thinking about embarking on careers and are considering where they would be willing to relocate for jobs. In the MTurk

experiment, 54% of profiles were rated by Democrats, 10% by Independents, and 35% by Republicans. The student sample was more balanced: 49% Democrats, 7% Independents, and 44% of profiles were rated by Republicans. More information on the samples and how they compare to nationally representative samples is available in the Online Appendix.

Respondents were presented with fifteen pairs of hypothetical job offers, each with six randomly assigned traits. After reading each pair of job offers, we asked respondents to rate the attractiveness of each job offer on a 5-point scale ranging from "Very attractive" to "Not at all attractive." The respondents were enthusiastic about the offers, on average; the MTurkers judged 75% of profiles positively, and the students were favorably disposed toward 71% of profiles. As a second outcome variable, we asked the respondents to select which of the two jobs they prefer.

One might object that this situation is unrealistic - job seekers seldomly have multiple job offers to compare. This may be true on average, but it is probably the most economically desirable potential residents who are most likely to have multiple job offers. Furthermore, job seekers often have a current job that they can compare any potential job offer to, meaning that the conjoint approach approximates well the actual decision process that job seekers engage in. Another objection may be that people do not pay much attention to politics and would be unaware of many actual instances of democratic backsliding. This is true, but many recent state examples of backsliding received widespread local and even national media coverage (e.g., Reynolds 2016).

We gave respondents a small bit of news about recent political developments in the state, which could have included one of the following examples of backsliding:

- The state legislature recently adopted a law to require a voter ID before voting.
- The state legislature recently adopted a law to eliminate collective bargaining rights (the ability to unionize) for teachers.
- The state legislature recently passed a law that would have increased penalties for protesters who obstructed traffic or access to airports.
- The state legislature recently passed a law that limited the Governor's ability to appoint cabinet members and members of the board of elections.

- The state legislature recently passed a redistricting plan that gives the majority party two extra seats in the state senate despite the party's declining vote shares.

These are good examples of backsliding in that they are government-led, strictly speaking legal erosions of democracy, since they weaken the link between public preferences, election results and policy outcomes. These actions have also been noted as eroding democracy by in-state observers (Reynolds 2016).

To benchmark any aversion to backsliding we also randomized exposure to two examples of other political developments that were not backsliding, one of which was negative and one of which was positive:

- The state legislature recently adopted a law to increase the number of bike trails in the state.

- Three members of the state legislature were recently indicted for accepting bribes.

If respondents had been following political news, it is possible they would know that much of this backsliding has occurred in few states (e.g. North Carolina, Michigan, and Wisconsin). These states each have one or two major metropolitan areas, and individuals might have preconceptions about the desirability of living in these areas. However, based only on the treatments it would be difficult to nail down which of the aforementioned states might be the location, and Detroit is quite different from, say, Raleigh.

To further mitigate this concern, we randomized several other attributes of the hypothetical job, including the type of location (rural area, a small college town, a mid-size city or a major metropolitan area), limiting the ability of subjects to have a strong inference about the metro area in question. In addition to location, each trial contained information about salary, the size of the company, the company's culture, and the state's partisan leanings. More information about the conditions is provided in the Online Appendix.

We analyze the experiment by estimating the average marginal component effect (AMCE) of each of the attributes of the job offer (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). The AMCE provides the marginal effect of each attribute over the joint distribution of the other included attributes, similar to estimating a regression with a suite of categorical variables. We cluster our standard errors at the respondent level to account

Figure 1: Unconditional AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. The outcome variable in the left panel is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale; the outcome variable in the right panel is the respondent's binary decision about whether to select the job, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Tables A2 and A3 (left panel) and Tables A6 and A7 (right panel).

for the fact that each respondent rated multiple profiles.

Results

Figure 1 presents the unconditional ACMEs for both outcome variables; we focus our discussion on the effects of democratic backsliding and defer presentation of the other treatment effects to the appendix.[1] The estimated results suggest that the presence of backsliding makes job offers less attractive. Beginning with the job rating outcome (left-hand panel), each of the democratic backsliding proposals has an estimated AMCE that is statistically distinguishable from zero. Because AMCEs are estimated relative to the baseline, each of the estimated democratic backsliding effects are estimated relative to this bike trail proposal. Looking at the job choice variable (right-hand panel), there is also evidence that respondents, especially the MTurk respondents, are less likely to "select" jobs in the presence of democratic backsliding. These effects are similarly consistently negative for both samples and consistently significant for the MTurk sample.

The estimated magnitude of these effects is substantively important. For instance, an increase in salary from \$75,000 to \$90,000 is associated with an AMCE of approximately 0.13 to 0.17 (depending on sample) for the job selection outcome. The anti-collective bargaining law has a AMCE of approximately -0.05 to -0.07. Thus, people's aversion to living in a state that strips collective bargaining rights from teachers is worth about

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[1]Figures were made with `dotwhisker` in R (Solt and Hu 2015).

Figure 2: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification, for the MTurk sample. The outcome variable in the left panel is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale; the outcome variable in the right panel is the respondent's binary decision about whether to select the job, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Full results (including for the student sample) are provided in Tables A4 and A5 and Figures A3 and A4.

$7,000. For the MTurk sample and this outcome, the other effects are about half this size; for the job rating outcome, the effects are similar in size, regularly equaling about half of the effect of an increase in salary from $75,000 to $90,000 (see Figure A2 in the Online Appendix). In other words, the size of these effects is large enough to be meaningful.

We also estimated conditional AMCEs based upon the partisanship of the respondent since most backsliding has taken place in Republican-controlled states. The results for the MTurk sample are shown in Figure 2; results for the student sample are provided in the Online Appendix (Figures A4 and A8).

Democrats appear more sensitive to democratic backsliding. The effects of the backsliding treatments are nearly always statistically distinguishable from zero for Democrats but not for Republicans. Across the two samples and two outcome variables, 21 of the 24 estimated AMCEs are statistically distinguishable from zero for Democratic respondents. The three exceptions for Democrats are in the student sample for the job selection outcome: these subjects were not sensitive to stripping gubernatorial power, gerrymandering or limiting protest rights (but were sensitive to voter identification and limiting union power). In contrast, for Republicans, only 4 of 24 of the estimates are statistically significant. Moreover, for over half of the estimated treatment effects (13 of 24), the estimated effects for Democratic and Republican respondents differed from one another;

in nearly all cases, the estimated effect for Democratic respondents was greater than the estimated effect for Republican respondents. We plot these differences in Figures A5 and A9 in the Online Appendix. Independents usually demonstrate effects about half way between Democrats and Republicans, but the small sample size means that the standard errors surrounding the estimated effects are large. Considering that Republicans did react negatively to corruption, we can conclude that they did not simply ignore state political conditions. Rather, it appears that the the backsliding-specific items do not have the effect on Republican respondents that we observe among Democrats.

Conclusion

Observers argue that many democracies, including several U.S. states, are experiencing democratic backsliding. For a number of reasons, political checks on backsliding can be relatively ineffective (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Yet, there may be economic checks on backsliding regimes. Using a conjoint experiment, we find in MTurk and student samples that individuals view jobs less favorably if they are located in states experiencing backsliding and are, often, less likely to be willing to hypothetically accept such a job. This means that firms will perhaps need to pay a "backsliding" premium or accept a less talented workforce, which will presumably harm company and economic performance over the long term. Thus, there are likely to be substantial economic costs associated with democratic backsliding.

Perhaps not surprisingly, our experiments provided some evidence that Democrats were more sensitive to backsliding. Firms and governments might view this as acceptable; they can simply hire the nation's abundant Republicans. Note, however, that Republicans do not prefer to live in backsliding areas, meaning that states cannot make up for the loss of backsliding-averse Democrats by making it more likely that Republicans will migrate there. Furthermore, because important sectors like tech and healthcare that bolster the "knowledge economy" skew heavily Democratic (Bonica, Rosenthal and Rothman 2019), engaging in actions that repel Democrats is likely to harm economic growth and even population health.

Our research is important in identifying potential economic consequences and ulti-

mately perhaps economic checks on backsliding regimes. Of course, more research is needed. Our results suggest there may be different sensitivities among older adults in the labor market compared to students seeking their first post-college job, for instance. At a minimum, however, our research shows that the economic effects of backsliding should be taken more seriously by scholars and even backsliding regimes, which may not care so much about democracy, but certainly do care about economic performance.

Acknowledgments

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Biographical Statements

Michael J. Nelson is Jeffrey L. Hyde and Sharon D. Hyde and Political Science Board of Visitors Early Career Professor in Political Science, Associate Professor of Political Science and Social Data Analytics, and Affiliate Law Faculty at The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, 16802.

Christopher Witko is Professor of Public Policy and Political Science and the Associate Director of the School of Public Policy at The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, 16802.

The Economic Costs of Democratic Backsliding? Backsliding and State Location Preferences of U.S. Job-seekers
Online Appendix

Sample Comparison

	MTurk Sample	Student Sample	Other Internet Samples Berinsky, Huber, Lenz	ANES-P 2008-09	Face to Face ANES 2008
% Female	43.7	44.9	60.1	57.6	55
% White	70.4	78.3	83.5	83	79.1
% Black	22.3	6.7	4.4	8.9	12
% Hispanic	18.0	8.1	6.7	5	9.1
Mean Age (Yrs)	37.0	19.9	32.3	49.7	46.6
Mean Ideology (7 pt.)	3.6	3.9	3.4	4.3	4.2
Education	62% Col Grad 26% Some Col	0% Col Grad 100% Some Col	14.9 yrs	16.2 yrs	13.5 yrs

Table A1: Comparison of Sample Demographics. ANES-P is the American National Election Panel Study conducted by Knowledge Networks and the ANES is the American National Election Study. Data from the ANES are weighted. Data for the remaining columns comes from Table 3 in Berinsky, Huber & Lenz (2012).

Table A1 compares the demographics of our samples to those of Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz (2012) as well as the ANES. The students in our student sample were recruited as part of introductory courses in the Political Science department and completed the survey either as part of a research participation assignment for a course or for extra credit.

Conjoint Treatments

	Job Offer 1	Job Offer 2
Salary	$90,000	$75,000
Company Size	500,000 Employees	2,500 Employees
Location	Rural Area	Mid-size city
Local News	The state legislature recently adopted a law to eliminate collective bargaining rights (the ability to unionize) for teachers	The state legislature recently passed a law that would have increased penalties for protesters who obstructed traffic or access to airports.
Political Climate	In a state that voted heavily for Hillary Clinton in 2016	In a state that voted heavily for Hillary Clinton in 2016
Company Culture	The company seeks to provide employees with constructive feedback to foster their career growth	You will have many opportunities to collaborate with talented people

Figure A1: An example trial from the conjoint experiment.

Figure A1 provides an example of a single trial from the conjoint experiment. The full text of the backsliding ("Local News") treatments were provided in the text of the paper. We based these treatments on actual events. For example, the treatment that read "The state legislature recently passed a law that would have increased penalties for protesters who obstructed traffic or access to airports" was based on Minnesota HF 55/HF 390/HF 896 and HF 1066.[2] Likewise, the treatment telling respondents that "The state legislature recently passed a law that limited the Governor's ability to appoint cabinet members and members of the board of elections" was modeled on a similar episode in North Carolina.[3]

The values for the other treatments follow:
- Salary
  - $75,000
  - $90,000
  - $105,000
- Company Size
  - 10 Employees
  - 2,500 Employees
  - 500,000 Employees
- Location
  - Rural Area
  - Small College Town
  - Mid-size City
  - Major Metropolitan Area
- Political Climate
  - "In a state that voted heavily for Hillary Clinton in 2016"

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[2] https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/rights-protesters/anti-protest-bills-around-country

[3] https://www.wfae.org/post/other-states-follow-north-carolina-gops-lead-limit-executive-power#stream/0

- "In a state that Hillary Clinton barely won in 2016"
  - "In a state that Donald Trump barely won in 2016"
  - "In a state that voted heavily for Donald Trump in 2016"
- Company Culture[4]
  - "You will have the ability to work on a variety of tasks and develop your skills in many areas"
  - "The company seeks to provide employees with constructive feedback to foster their career growth"
  - "Employees are given many opportunities for advancement within the organization,"
  - "You will have many opportunities to collaborate with talented people"

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[4]To craft these treatments, we selected example job advertisement statements from those used in a field experiment by Smith, Chapman & Jones (2015).

Results: Job Rating Outcome Variable

Figure A2: Unconditional AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Tables A2 and A3.

Figure A3: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Table A4.

Figure A4: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the student sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Table A5.

Figure A5: Estimated difference in AMCEs by partisanship. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Attribute	Level	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.22	0.03	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.07	0.03	0.02
Backsliding	Protest	-0.09	0.03	0.00
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.17	0.03	0.00
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.18	0.03	0.00
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.09	0.03	0.00
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.07	0.02	0.00
Culture	Great Talent	-0.05	0.02	0.05
Culture	Task Variety	-0.06	0.02	0.01
Location	Metro Area	-0.09	0.03	0.00
Location	Midsize City	-0.00	0.02	0.90
Location	Rural Area	-0.09	0.02	0.00
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.03	0.03	0.23
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.11	0.03	0.00
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.24	0.04	0.00
Salary	$90,000	0.24	0.02	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.44	0.03	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.02	0.02	0.37
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.04	0.02	0.12
Number of Obs.	21965			
Number of Respondents	735			

Table A2: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale.

Attribute	Level	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.31	0.05	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.11	0.04	0.01
Backsliding	Protest	-0.17	0.04	0.00
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.23	0.04	0.00
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.29	0.05	0.00
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.08	0.04	0.04
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.07	0.03	0.05
Culture	Great Talent	-0.01	0.03	0.84
Culture	Task Variety	-0.03	0.03	0.29
Location	Metro Area	0.14	0.04	0.00
Location	Midsize City	0.13	0.04	0.00
Location	Rural Area	-0.14	0.04	0.00
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	0.01	0.03	0.68
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.02	0.04	0.61
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.14	0.05	0.01
Salary	$90,000	0.36	0.03	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.62	0.04	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.03	0.03	0.31
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.00	0.03	0.89
Number of Obs.	10015			
Number of Respondents	336			

Table A3: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. These estimates are from the student sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale.

Attribute	Level	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
		AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Salary	$90,000	0.27	0.03	0.00	0.22	0.07	0.00	0.21	0.03	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.48	0.03	0.00	0.47	0.08	0.00	0.38	0.04	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.03	0.03	0.25	-0.01	0.07	0.90	0.02	0.04	0.65
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.01	0.03	0.66	-0.14	0.06	0.03	-0.04	0.04	0.37
Location	Metro Area	-0.06	0.03	0.08	-0.32	0.08	0.00	-0.09	0.04	0.04
Location	Midsize City	0.03	0.03	0.42	-0.09	0.07	0.19	-0.04	0.04	0.37
Location	Rural Area	-0.13	0.04	0.00	-0.08	0.06	0.18	-0.05	0.04	0.17
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.09	0.03	0.01	-0.08	0.08	0.30	-0.05	0.04	0.19
Culture	Great Talent	-0.05	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.08	0.88	-0.04	0.04	0.29
Culture	Task Variety	-0.08	0.03	0.01	-0.08	0.08	0.31	-0.01	0.04	0.75
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.11	0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.08	0.71	0.09	0.04	0.04
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.29	0.04	0.00	-0.15	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.05	0.00
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.56	0.05	0.00	-0.17	0.12	0.15	0.23	0.05	0.00
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.26	0.04	0.00	-0.18	0.10	0.09	-0.15	0.05	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.12	0.04	0.00	0.08	0.10	0.42	-0.01	0.05	0.78
Backsliding	Protest	-0.14	0.04	0.00	-0.10	0.09	0.30	-0.01	0.05	0.90
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.21	0.04	0.00	-0.19	0.11	0.09	-0.07	0.05	0.12
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.27	0.05	0.00	-0.12	0.10	0.25	-0.03	0.05	0.50
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.17	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.10	0.78	0.02	0.04	0.60
Number of Obs.	21965									
Number of Respondents	735									

Table A4: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale.

Attribute	Level	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
		AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Salary	$90,000	0.30	0.04	0.00	0.32	0.12	0.01	0.41	0.05	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.59	0.05	0.00	0.48	0.13	0.00	0.67	0.06	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.01	0.04	0.90	0.06	0.11	0.59	0.07	0.04	0.12
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.04	0.04	0.42	-0.08	0.15	0.59	0.06	0.04	0.18
Location	Metro Area	0.23	0.06	0.00	-0.11	0.20	0.57	0.08	0.05	0.12
Location	Midsize City	0.15	0.05	0.00	-0.01	0.12	0.94	0.11	0.05	0.04
Location	Rural Area	-0.19	0.05	0.00	-0.12	0.09	0.20	-0.11	0.05	0.04
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.04	0.05	0.38	-0.34	0.07	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.49
Culture	Great Talent	-0.01	0.05	0.90	-0.00	0.13	0.98	-0.01	0.05	0.86
Culture	Task Variety	-0.03	0.05	0.50	-0.02	0.12	0.85	-0.03	0.04	0.50
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.12	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.95	0.15	0.05	0.01
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.34	0.05	0.00	-0.07	0.15	0.65	0.34	0.06	0.00
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.69	0.07	0.00	0.11	0.11	0.34	0.41	0.06	0.00
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.39	0.07	0.00	-0.01	0.16	0.94	-0.26	0.07	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.17	0.05	0.00	-0.02	0.17	0.93	-0.06	0.06	0.32
Backsliding	Protest	-0.26	0.06	0.00	-0.17	0.12	0.17	-0.05	0.06	0.42
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.34	0.06	0.00	-0.17	0.18	0.33	-0.12	0.06	0.04
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.44	0.07	0.00	-0.48	0.23	0.04	-0.10	0.06	0.11
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.17	0.06	0.00	-0.21	0.18	0.26	0.03	0.06	0.62
Number of Obs.	10015									
Number of Respondents	336									

Table A5: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the student sample, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. The outcome variable is the respondent's rating of the job offer on a 5-point scale.

Results: Job Choice Outcome Variable

Figure A6: Unconditional AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Tables A6 and A7.

Figure A7: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Table A8.

Figure A8: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the student sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results are provided in Table A9.

Figure A9: Estimated difference in AMCEs by partisanship. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer, and the whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Attribute	Level	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.07	0.01	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Backsliding	Protest	-0.03	0.01	0.01
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.01	0.01	0.46
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.05	0.01	0.00
Culture	Great Talent	-0.03	0.01	0.00
Culture	Task Variety	-0.03	0.01	0.00
Location	Metro Area	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Location	Midsize City	-0.00	0.01	0.84
Location	Rural Area	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.01	0.01	0.59
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.03	0.01	0.01
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.06	0.01	0.00
Salary	$90,000	0.13	0.01	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.25	0.01	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	-0.01	0.01	0.34
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.02	0.01	0.03
Number of Obs.	21965			
Number of Respondents	735			

Table A6: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer.

Attribute	Level	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.10	0.02	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.00	0.02	0.97
Backsliding	Protest	-0.02	0.02	0.39
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.01	0.02	0.73
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.07	0.02	0.00
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.01	0.02	0.68
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.01	0.01	0.51
Culture	Great Talent	-0.01	0.01	0.52
Culture	Task Variety	-0.02	0.01	0.18
Location	Metro Area	0.06	0.02	0.00
Location	Midsize City	0.06	0.01	0.00
Location	Rural Area	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	0.02	0.01	0.10
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	0.01	0.01	0.34
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.03	0.02	0.11
Salary	$90,000	0.17	0.01	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.33	0.01	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.01	0.01	0.33
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.01	0.01	0.29
Number of Obs.	10015			
Number of Respondents	336			

Table A7: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment. These estimates are from the student sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer.

Attribute	Level	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
		AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Salary	$90,000	0.14	0.01	0.00	0.14	0.03	0.00	0.11	0.01	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.27	0.02	0.00	0.31	0.04	0.00	0.20	0.02	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.00	0.01	0.94	-0.01	0.02	0.58	-0.02	0.01	0.20
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.02	0.01	0.12	-0.03	0.03	0.27	-0.02	0.02	0.18
Location	Metro Area	-0.01	0.01	0.32	-0.09	0.03	0.00	-0.06	0.02	0.00
Location	Midsize City	0.01	0.01	0.53	0.00	0.03	0.87	-0.02	0.02	0.16
Location	Rural Area	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.03	0.33	-0.04	0.02	0.02
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.05	0.01	0.00	-0.13	0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.13
Culture	Great Talent	-0.04	0.01	0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.08	-0.02	0.02	0.11
Culture	Task Variety	-0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.16
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.04	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.03	0.63	0.04	0.02	0.01
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.09	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.86	0.06	0.02	0.00
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.17	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.44	0.10	0.02	0.00
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.11	0.02	0.00	-0.04	0.04	0.28	-0.02	0.02	0.36
Backsliding	Governor	-0.06	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.51	-0.02	0.02	0.37
Backsliding	Protest	-0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.04	0.03	0.27	-0.02	0.02	0.35
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.07	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.50	-0.02	0.02	0.38
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.09	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.94	-0.01	0.02	0.57
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.26	0.03	0.02	0.15
Number of Obs.	21965									
Number of Respondents	735									

Table A8: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the MTurk sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer.

Attribute	Level	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
		AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value	AMCE	Std. Err.	P-Value
Salary	$90,000	0.14	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.05	0.00	0.20	0.02	0.00
Salary	$105,000	0.28	0.02	0.00	0.35	0.04	0.00	0.37	0.02	0.00
Size	2,500 Employees	0.00	0.02	0.85	0.04	0.06	0.50	0.02	0.02	0.23
Size	500,000 Employees	-0.02	0.02	0.25	-0.07	0.06	0.26	0.01	0.02	0.58
Location	Metro Area	0.09	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.42	0.04	0.02	0.11
Location	Midsize City	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.26	0.05	0.02	0.02
Location	Rural Area	-0.04	0.02	0.04	-0.10	0.04	0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.11
Culture	Frequent Feedback	-0.02	0.02	0.33	-0.09	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.39
Culture	Great Talent	-0.03	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.06	0.67	0.00	0.02	0.85
Culture	Task Variety	-0.01	0.02	0.51	-0.00	0.05	0.99	-0.03	0.02	0.17
Partisanship	Weak Clinton State	-0.04	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.78	0.08	0.02	0.00
Partisanship	Weak Trump State	-0.08	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.85	0.11	0.02	0.00
Partisanship	Strong Trump State	-0.20	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.90	0.15	0.02	0.00
Backsliding	Corruption	-0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.12	0.07	0.09	-0.11	0.03	0.00
Backsliding	Governor	-0.00	0.03	0.95	-0.03	0.06	0.63	0.00	0.03	0.94
Backsliding	Protest	-0.03	0.03	0.32	-0.05	0.07	0.44	0.01	0.03	0.78
Backsliding	Redistricting	-0.01	0.03	0.57	-0.06	0.10	0.55	0.01	0.03	0.81
Backsliding	Unionize	-0.10	0.03	0.00	-0.20	0.08	0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.73
Backsliding	Voter ID	-0.05	0.02	0.05	-0.01	0.08	0.93	0.03	0.03	0.24

Number of Obs.	10015
Number of Respondents	336

Table A9: AMCE estimates from the conjoint experiment, conditional on the respondent's party identification. These estimates are from the student sample. The outcome variable is the respondent's binary decision whether or not to select the job offer.